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Explaining national border effects 
in the Quad food trade 
 
 
Alessandro Olper     Valentina Raimondi 
 
Abstract 
Starting from a theoretically consistent gravity model, this paper first provides estimates of bilateral ‘border effects’ 
in food trade among Quad countries (Canada, USA, Japan and EU) at the ISIC 4-digit level. Then, it investigates the 
underlying reasons of border effect, assessing the role played by policy barriers (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) with 
respect to barriers unrelated to trade policy, such as information related costs and cultural proximity. In contrast with 
several previous findings, we show that policy barriers are part of the story in explaining the strong trade reduction 
effect induced by national borders, and this is especially true when we control for the endogeneity of trade policy to 
imports, as suggested by political economy arguments. Moreover, our results show that elements linked to cultural 
proximity and consumer preference for home goods, matter a great deal in explaining the magnitude of border 
effects. The trade reduction effect induced by these policy-unrelated components are from 1.5 to 3 times larger than 
that induced by policy barriers. These results have implications for the economic and welfare significance of national 
borders. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper uses a gravity-like structure to measure and explain the level of ‘border effect’ in the 
food manufacturing trade among Quad countries - United States, European Union, Canada and 
Japan. The border effect measures how much trade within countries is above international trade, 
due to cross-border measures such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers and all other factors that might 
impede trade. Thus it captures all the impediments related to the existence of national borders.  
The border effect literature emerges from the McCallum’s (1995) findings on the large trade 
reduction effect induced by the Canada-US national border. This author has shown that trade 
between two Canadian provinces was, on average, 22 times greater than their trade with US 
states, after controlling for size and transport costs. This intriguing finding subsequently 
stimulated a lot of research. 
While recent border effect estimates from theoretical-consistent gravity models have significantly 
reduced their magnitude (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Feenstra, 2004), the actual 
figures are still far higher than recognized trade barriers. For example, with an import substitution 
elasticity of 5, the ad valorem equivalent of border effects ranges from 70% to 120% for OECD  
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agricultural trade (see Olper and Raimondi, 2005). Thus, given the magnitude of these border 
costs, the most recent literature is now focusing on their explanation, trying to understand why 
national borders matter so much for international trade (Chen, 2004).  
From this perspective, the main factors highlighted in the literature that may affect the magnitude 
of border effect can be divided into two broad, but conceptually different, categories (see, e.g., 
Evans, 2003): i) border costs related to policy barriers such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs); ii) border costs unrelated to policy barriers, such as consumer ‘home bias’ in preference 
or cultural distance, and transaction costs due to communication issues. 
Till now, the few papers that have tried to disentangle the role played by these explanations on 
the size of border effect have, generally speaking, achieved mixed results. For example, Head and 
Mayer (2000) and Chen (2004) for intra EU trade, and Mayer and Zignago (2005) for North-
South trade, have shown that NTBs and tariffs, respectively, do not matter so much in explaining 
border effects. Differently, Fontagné et al. (2005) show a sizable effect of NTBs and tariffs, on 
border effects between the US, EU and Japanese trade in manufactured goods. At the same time, 
Evans (2003) documents a nil effect of the ‘home bias’ in preferences on the magnitude of border 
effects, that instead seem to play a role in the analysis of Fontagné et al. (2005). Finally, Rauch 
(2001), Wagner et al. (2002) and Combes et al. (2005) suggest that business and social networks 
operating across borders promote trade notably through reduction in information costs and 
diffusion of preferences. Indeed, “informational barriers make it difficult both for consumers to 
obtain relevant information on the goods produced in another location and for non-local 
producers to learn the tastes of consumers or to be aware of the practices of local retailers” 
(Combes et al., 2005 p. 2).  
Starting from these considerations, we add to the growing debate on the determinants of border 
effects, improving analyses made previously in three main directions. First, by exploring whether 
new proxies capturing information related issues and cultural proximity have a sizable role in 
explaining national border effects. Second, by using better and more comprehensive data on 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Finally by taking into account the endogeneity of policy barriers, 
due to political economy arguments, along the line suggested by Trefler (1993) and Lee and 
Swagel (1997). 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and 
empirical framework. Section 3 describes the data sources and the variables used in the empirical 
model. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of our empirical results. The final section 
discusses the main implications and our conclusions.  
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2  Theoretical and empirical framework 
The estimation of border effect from gravity models, initiated by McCallum (1995) and Wei 
(1996), recently found a solid theoretical foundation in the work of Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) and Feenstra (2004). The underlying idea is to measure the (inverse) level of trade 
integration between two countries, comparing their bilateral trade with respect to the trade flow 
taking place within their own borders. The estimated border effect shows how much trade within 
countries is above international trade, due to cross-border measures such as tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, and all other factors that might impede trade. Thus, from this perspective, the border 
effect represents an indirect way to measure overall market access issues.
1  
2.1  The model  
Our empirical framework is based on a gravity-like structure derived from a monopolistic 
competition model of trade introduced by Krugman (1980). Monopolistic competition is not the 
only available model that can be used to derive a gravity equation. However, it seems the most 
natural when we consider food trade among the Quad countries. In this paper we use the gravity 
like structure introduced by Head and Mayer (2000). The model establishes a relation between 
the relative amounts consumers spend on foreign and domestic goods, and their relative price net 
of transport costs.   
This model combines CES utility with iceberg-type ad valorem equivalent transaction costs and 
non strategic price setting behavior by firms. Denoting mij the value of imports of country i from 
j, and mii  the value of imports of country i from itself, Head and Mayer (2000) show that relative 
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where, vj is the exporter’s industry production value, a ij represents the i consumer preferences 
with respect to varieties imported from j, pj is the mill price in the exporter country, and σ is the 
elasticity of substitution. Finally, (1+τij) is the transaction costs that determine the delivered price 
of the imported product, pij = (1+τij)pj.  
Before deriving an estimable equation, it is necessary to model both the transaction costs (1+τij) 
and the preference (aij) components of equation (1). 
                                                      
1 For example, Mayer and Zignago (2005) recently stressed that the border effect accounts for the fact that the 
majority of internal demand is met by domestic producers, not foreign. Thus an ideal protection index from the point  
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Transaction costs components 
Let us consider three different elements in transaction costs: i) transport costs; ii) trade-policy; iii) 
information related costs 
()( )( ) ij ij ij ij ij I ntb t d + + = + 1 1 1
δ τ      (2) 
In this specification, we use distance between countries as proxy for physical transport costs dij, 
while trade policy costs are related to international trade-policy and depend on the level of 
protection of the country i vs. country j. Thus, trade-policy consists of an ad valorem tariff tij and 
the ad valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers ntbij. Finally, Iij represents information costs.  
We assume that trade-policy cost structure vary across all the partner pairs, and depends on the 
direction of the flow. Thus, the protection structure is specified as 
] exp[ ) 1 )( 1 ( 3 2 1 ij ij ij ij ij CANEU a EUCAN a EU a ntb t + + ≡ + +     (3) 
For simplicity purposes, equation (3) considers only trade between European countries and 
Canada, where EUij is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when i and j belong to EU (for i ≠ j), 
EUCANij is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when i (≠ j) belongs to EU and j is Canada, CANEUij 
is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when i is Canada and j (≠ i) belongs to the EU. 
The information costs depend on the ease of communication and the quality of reciprocal 
information and result higher between two geographically and linguistically noncontiguous 
regions. Moreover, we assume that also the information cost structure varies across all the partner 
pairs. Thus, following Combes et al. (2005), their structure can be specified as follows 
() ] ) exp[( 1 3 2 1 ij ij ij ij ij ij ij L C CANEU b EUCAN b EU b news I γ ψ
µ − − + + + =
−  (4) 
where newsij measures the bilateral flows of newspapers and is used as a proxy for the ease of 
communication and the quality of reciprocal information (Disdier and Mayer, 2005); Cij and Lij 
are dummy variables that take value 1 when country i and country j (for i≠ j) share a common 
border and/or speak a common language (0 otherwise).   
Consumer preference components 
The consumer preference aij is often simplified as a ‘home bias’ in preferences for goods 
produced in the home country, mostly because bilateral information on preferences is not 
available. However, we assume that consumers prefer goods produced in a contiguous country 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of view of foreign firms needs a benchmark based on the best possible market access situation, that is the one faced 
by national producers on the home market. This is exactly what the estimated border effect tells us.  
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and that the sharing of cultural features generates greater similarity in taste and mitigates the 
‘home bias’ (see Disdier and Mayer, 2005).  
Thus, we use bilateral exchange in printed books as well as contiguity and common language 
dummies as proxies of cultural proximity and similar preferences between two countries. 
Moreover, as assumed for information costs and formal protection measures, we also assume that 
the structure of consumer preferences (aij) varies across all the partner pairs, and depends on the 
flow direction of a given pair 
()( ) [] ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij L C CANEU c EUCAN c EU c e books a γ ψ
ρ + + + + − + ≡ 3 2 1 exp 1    (5) 
where booksij brings common cultural traits and therefore should be a proxy of similar consumer 
taste; eij is a random component of preferences. 
2.2  The empirical model  
Omitting protection, information and preference explanatory variables, the estimable gravity 
equation from the monopolistic competition model of trade yields the following logarithmic form 
() () ( )
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 (6) 
where εij = (σ -1)(eij - eii). 
Taking the antilog of the estimated country-group dummy coefficients we have the so called 
border effect, namely how much intra-country trade is above international trade after controlling 
for size, transport costs and relative prices. Each of the dummy variables’ coefficient (1-
σ)(an+bn+cn), thus captures both the policy component, an, and the non-policy components of the 
border, bn and cn (information costs and consumer preferences, respectively).  
For example, the coefficient on EUCANij equal to (1-σ )(a2+b2+c2), indicates the difficulty faced 
by Canadian exporters when selling their products to EU markets, and includes the average level 
of importing country protection, the information costs and the consumer ‘home bias’ component. 
Symmetrically, the CANEUij coefficient, equal to (1-σ  )(a3+b3+c3),  indicates the difficulty 
European exporters have in accessing the Canadian market.  
Thus, the use of the empirical model specified in equation (6) drives our work to this first result: 
the estimation of bilateral border effect inclusive of all bilateral trade impediments. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion in the model of the assumed border effect determinants, specified in 
equations (2-5), allows us to reach a second result: an analysis of the border effect reduction 
induced by policy and non-policy barriers. Indeed, the inclusion in equation (6) of tariff and NTB  
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should reduce the policy component of the border (an), just as the inclusion of the information 
network variables and cultural proximity variable should reduce the magnitude of information 
(bn) and preference (cn) component of the border. By doing so we can asses their relative 
importance in explaining national border effects. 
3  Data and measures 
Our gravity model includes 13 countries: United States, Canada, Japan and 10 European Union 
countries
2. The database considers the imports among the Quad countries for the period 1996-
2001 (see Table A1 in Appendix). The full data set presents a total of 14,061 observations and 
considers 33% of the world food trade and 52% of the Quad country food imports from the 
world. The necessary data to implement equation (6) involve the use of several sources: 
-  UN Comtrade database for bilateral trade, at the HS-96 6-digit level, reported by the 
importer countries, then aggregated at the ISIC 4-digit level. 
-  OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services database, for output data, at ISIC 
Rev.3 4-digit level (code from 1511 to 1600), supplemented by other national sources in the 
case of missing values. 
-  CEPII (Centre d’Economie Publique and Internationale)
3 for distance between and within 
countries, and for dummies on language and contiguity. 
-  Penn World Tables v.6.1 for relative prices
4. 
-  MacMaps (Market Access Maps) database for ad valorem tariffs at the bilateral HS 6-digit 
level, then aggregated using arithmetic means and converted to ISIC 4-digit. These data 
represent a not negligible improvement on the cruder Unctad Trains data usually used in 
previous studies (see, Boüet et al. 2003, for a description of the MacMap database).  
-  Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) for the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of NTBs, at the HS 
6-digit level
5. These data are then aggregated and converted to ISIC 4-digit using arithmetic 
means. Note that due to data problems and the conceptual difficulty of measuring the ad 
valorem equivalent of NTBs, previous studies normally used a-theoretic indices based on 
frequency or coverge ratio to capture the trade effect of NTBs (see, e.g., Haveman and 
                                                      
2 The observations for Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are not considered due to a large 
zero value in the production dataset. 
3 See, http://www.cepii.fr. 
4 The industry-level mill price required by the theoretical model is not used because of endogeneity concerns and low 
data availability. Thus, following the example of previous authors we considered the more general price level of 
GDP, expressed relative to the United States.  
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Thursby 2000; Fontagnè et al., 2005; Lee and Swagel, 1997; Trefler, 1993). However, the 
last procedure implicitly imposed a strong regularity condition, because it assumed that all 
changes in the coverage ratio are equally important for trade flow, ignoring the fact that 
different NTBs can have different trade effects (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). An 
extract of the average tariffs and AVE of NTBs is shown in table 1. 
The empirical implementation of equation (5) needs intra-country trade data, but these figures 
were not available for our country sample. Thus, as in Wei (1996), Chen (2004) and others, we 
constructed such measures based on the assumption that what a country imports from itself is just 
the difference between its total output and its total export to the rest of the world in each sector.  
Finally, as discussed in section (2), we use two variables as proxy for information related costs 
and cultural proximity: bilateral flow of newspapers and bilateral exchange in printed books, 
respectively. Both variables are calculated as bilateral imports relative to importer production 
value. Trade data come from UN Comtrade, while the production data are from OECD, UNIDO 
and National statistics.    
4  Results 
4.1  The level of border effects 
We begin with an estimation of the magnitude of the border effect, testing some different 
specifications based on the gravity equation (6). The results are reported in Table 2. Regressions 
from 1 to 3 are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled over 1996-2001, and across 18 food 
industries. Differently, regression 4 uses Heckman’s two-stage procedure to address selection 
bias concern, due to the zero value of some bilateral trade flow combinations.   
Column (1) involves a simple specification where we estimate only one border effect coefficient, 
the Quad average border effect. The overall fit of the regression is in line with the usual findings 
based on this kind of gravity specification.
6 All the estimated coefficients have the expected sign 
and are highly significant (p<0.01). The coefficient on relative production, equal to 0.8, is quite 
near the unitary value predicted by theory. The trade elasticity of relative distance is, as expected, 
negative, as is the relative price. However the last coefficient appears too small to represent the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
5  To obtain the AVE of NTBs, these authors first estimate the impact of NTBs on imports using Leamer’s 
comparative advantage approach. Then they transform the quantity impact into price equivalent, using a careful 
estimate of the import demand elasticity, at HS 6-digit.   
6 Specifically, the relative nature of our specification gives lower explanatory power with respect to traditional or 
fixed effect gravity specifications. This is not surprising as in our case the variables are computed as differences with 
respect to internal flow used as the reference. Thus, our specification is comparable to a first-difference panel model  
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elasticity of substitution, a result that often emerges from this kind of specification (see Head and 
Mayer, 2000). Finally, the coefficient on contiguity is significantly positive, while the effect of 
language is virtually nil.   
This basic specification gives quite a large estimated border effect. Its magnitude implies that, on 
average, each country trades around 58 times more [=exp(4.07)] within its national borders than 
with another Quad country. Two countries sharing a common border have a border effect reduced 
from 58 to 16 [=exp(4.07-1.26)], everything else holds constant.    
In column (2) we split the single border into 13 dummy variables, one for each of the possible 
bilateral combinations of the four Quad countries
7. The border effect for intra-EU trade is quite 
large. This means that intra-country trade is, on average, 69 times greater [=exp(4.24)] than 
crossing a national border between EU countries. A comparable estimate for food trade does not 
exist, but a recent estimation for all manufactured goods by Fontagné et al. (2005) found an intra-
EU border effect of only 12.8 in the late nineties. However, Head and Mayer (2000) found also 
that intra-EU border coefficients for most ‘ingestible products’ are higher than for non-food 
products, ranging from 49 for dairy to 600 for sugar. Thus, from this perspective, our results are 
within the range of the previous border effect estimation on food trade in the EU.  
Contrary to expectations, the border effect for intra-EU trade is not the lowest one among the 
Quad countries. Indeed, quite surprisingly, Japan’s market presents an easier access level for 
imports from all the other countries considered here, especially from the United States. Moreover, 
Japanese exporters suffer a constantly higher level of border effect, evident not only for the US 
but also for the EU and Canadian markets.  This defines big asymmetries across these country-
trade combinations.   
The results, albeit quite surprising, are in any case similar to previous findings, showing that the 
Japanese market is often more open to imports from the US, than the reverse. For example, 
Fontagné et al. (2005) consider that this ‘spectacular’ result might be driven by an overestimate 
of the US-Japan distance, with respect to intra-EU distances. By contrast, Harrigan and Vanjani 
(2003) explain it by considering that the US has a proportionately larger demand for 
manufactured goods. However, another explanation of the low border effect for Japan food 
imports could be related to the strong differences in comparative advantage, not captured by the 
model, due to the resource based (land) nature of food production.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
estimation that, notoriously, increased the variance to be explained compared to the estimations in levels (see 
Combes et al., 2005 on this point).  
7 In agreement with previous literature (Fontagné et al., 2005; Mayer and Zignago, 2005), we dropped the regression 
constant so as to incorporate all the dummy variables for the estimation of each bilateral border coefficient.  
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To check for the last conjecture, two classical endowment measures were introduced into column 
3 of Table 2: land per-capita and GDP per-capita, both expressed as a ratio between the exporter 
and importer values to preserve the relative nature of the model (source: World Development 
indicators). Interestingly, the two variables are highly significant, and their introduction induces a 
significant change in the estimated border coefficients that appears in line with the comparative 
advantage hypothesis. Indeed, in each bilateral combination we see a reduction (increase) in the 
border coefficients of the relative land abundance (scarce) countries, that is broadly proportional 
to the country’s endowment differences in land.    
With this modification of the base model, the strong border effect asymmetries shown in 
regression (2) are, at least partially, recomposed with common perception. For example, the 
figures suggest that there exists a higher border protection in the EU (vis-à-vis US producers) 
than in the US (vis-à-vis EU producers) or in border protection in Canada (vis-à-vis US 
producers) rather than the reverse. However, Japan’s border effect incongruence, albeit reduced, 
is still present.  
The last regression of Table 2 reports a specification identical to column (3) but estimated with 
Heckman’s two stage procedure (a first-stage probit model and a second-stage OLS model). The 
significant coefficient on Mills ratio in the bottom half of the table indicates the need for this 
adjustment. As a result of this correction, the border effects in several cases are somewhat 
increased. However, the slight increase in border coefficient does not change the border effect 
patterns discussed above.  
Not surprising, border effects also differ across industries. Table A2 (in appendix) gives the 
results of estimating industry-specific gravity equations, and orders the industries in terms of 
decreasing magnitude of border effect. The strongest value, equal to 483 [=exp(6.18)], is found 
for the manufacture of sugar, followed by animal feed, tobacco and soft drinks.  These results are 
in line with the Head and Mayer (2000) findings, both for order and magnitude of border 
coefficients. On the contrary, the lowest border effects are estimated for the distilling industry, 
the manufacture of cocoa and of dairy products where the border effects range from 4 [=exp(1.2)] 
to 6 [=exp(1.85)] respectively. The dairy value is close to the border effect estimated by Chen 
(2004) for dairies and cheese trade between EU countries, equal to 5.7. 
4.2  Explaining border effects: the role of policy and non-policy barriers 
In the previous section we estimated bilateral levels of border effects that derive from both policy 
and non-policy related border costs. Now, let us try to answer a few additional key questions: 
how much of the national borders are due to policy barriers? Or, which kind of barriers are more  
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‘protectionist’: tariffs and NTBs or policy unrelated barriers such as information related costs or 
cultural proximity?  
Trying to answer these questions is important because, as recently argued by several authors (see, 
e.g., Evans, 2003; Chen, 2004; Anderson and vanWincoop, 2002), the economic significance of 
the border differs greatly if policy, not preferences or information related costs, poses the main 
national border hindrances. In fact, in the first case the importance of the border translates 
directly into distortions, with significant welfare costs and a role for policy, while in the second 
case it does not.   
Following Fontagnè et al. (2005), to understand the relative importance of the two explanations, 
variable proxies for the different determinants of border effects are introduced into the 
specifications. Then, by measuring the resulting reduction in the estimated border effects we have 
an estimation of the role played by the variables in explaining the trade reduction effect of 
national borders. 
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the results of a basic regression estimated on the 2000-01 data, with 
a specification identical to Column 3 of Table 2. Thus, it represents our benchmark to compare 
the explanatory power of the determinants of border effects. The regressions are estimated by 
OLS as the Mills ratio is insignificant for half the specifications, suggesting that working with 
only one year of data does not justify the Heckman procedure.  
4.2.1. The impact of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on national borders 
In regression (2) we add the first policy component of the border, tariffs. The result is that 
bilateral tariffs, with a negative and highly significant coefficient, explain a not negligible part of 
the border. Indeed, except for the EU countries that have nil bilateral tariffs, border coefficients 
decrease in all country combinations, with a (simple) average border effect reduction of 26%. 
This result confirms the findings of Fontagné et al. (2005), though the border effect reduction is, 
in the present case, much larger.  
The changes in border effect induced by tariffs, for each bilateral country combination, are 
reported in Table 4. For instance, the figures indicate that when only tariffs are controlled for, the 
total border reduction of EU imports from Canada varies by  [exp(5.82−6.24)−1]= −34%, where 
6.24 and 5.82 are the estimates of the border coefficients, taken from Table 3 columns (1) and 
(2), respectively. As can be seen, tariffs explain about 47% of Japan’s border effect for imports 
coming from the other Quad countries, but only 12% of the US’ border effects for imports 
coming from the EU and Japan.   
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Column (3) adds the ad valorem equivalent of NTB as a policy variable. Once again, there is a 
general decrease in border coefficient (except for intra-EU trade) and the NTB coefficient 
significantly decreases bilateral trade.
8 Note that, the (simple) average border effect reduction of 
NTB, equal to 31%, is higher than the reduction induced by tariffs. Thus, non-tariff barriers seem 
more protectionist than tariffs. Moreover, the stronger border effect reduction is that involving 
access to the EU market (50%), followed by access to Japan (45%) and USA (26%) respectively 
(see Table 4, column 2). 
Next, column (4) of Table 3 includes the two policy variables together. It can be seen that their 
coefficients are both significantly negative. Overall, the border effect reduction explained by 
policy barriers ranges from 23% for US export to Canada to 60% for the combinations involving 
Japan as the importing country, with an average border effect reduction of 39%. Thus, in contrast 
with most of the previous findings, our figures suggest that policy barriers explain a not 
negligible component of the border effects in the Quad food trade. Moreover, they show that the 
trade reduction effect induced by NTBs dominates that of tariffs. Finally and not surprisingly, the 
inclusion of policy variables do not affect the other trade cost components of our model, namely 
the coefficients of distance, language and contiguity variables (see the bottom of Table 4).  
4.2.2. The impact of information related costs and cultural proximity 
In the next regression of Table 3, we add to the basic specification our first non-policy related 
proxy, the bilateral flow of newspapers (column (5)). This variable should capture the ease of 
communication and quality of reciprocal information, thus reducing the information related 
component of the trade costs. As can be seen, its coefficient is positive and strongly significant 
and, interestingly, it induces a quite strong reduction in the estimated border effects. Specifically, 
information related costs induce an average variation in border effects of about −50%, with a 
higher value for EU imports from Canada (−83%), and a lower one for combinations involving 
Japan. Note that these patterns of border effect variations appear consistent with the idea that the 
proxy captures information related costs. Moreover, this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, 
when information costs are controlled for, we detected a reduction in the language effect (47%), 
which is four times stronger with respect to the reduction in the contiguity effect (12%) (see the 
last lines of Table 4). Finally, it is also interesting to note that the inclusion of informational 
proxy reduce the impact of transport costs by about 30%. This suggests that the traditional 
distance coefficient of the gravity equation captures more than the simple transport cost 
                                                      
8 It is important to underline that using a frequency ratio of NTBs, instead of the ad valorem equivalent used here,  
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components of trade costs. Similar results are obtained by Combes et al. (2005), using as 
information related proxy the stock of migrants.   
Regression (6) of Table 3, analyzes the impact of cultural similarity, proxy by bilateral exchange 
in books. The estimated coefficient is positive and strongly significant, at the same time the 
inclusion of this variable induces a very strong reduction in the estimated bilateral border 
coefficients. Cultural proximity and preferences thus appear important determinants of the border 
effect, inducing an average reduction of about 83%. Moreover, it is interesting to note that with 
the exclusion of US exports to Japan, the variation in border effects when cultural ties are 
controlled for, appears quite uniform between the different bilateral country combinations. 
Finally, while cultural proximity affects the coefficients of both language (−50%) and contiguity 
(−26%) dummies, the effect on distance is quite limited (−11%).   
Next, in Column 7 of Table 3 we add the non-policy variables simultaneously. When controlling 
for the bilateral exchange of books, the impact of the information related proxy (newspapers) is 
significantly lower than when introduced alone. Differently, the effect of the cultural proximity 
variable is only slight affected. Therefore, considering the stronger border reduction induced by 
books, one can conclude that in our dataset the information related component of the border, 
tends to be dominated by trade costs due to cultural distance and consumer preferences. However, 
such a conclusion should be reached with care as the significantly lower trade creation effect - 
induced by information related costs, relative to the cultural and preferences component - could 
simply be due to the poor proxy used here. Indeed, as stressed by Disdier and Mayer (2005), 
newspapers, due to time constraints, could also be printed directly in the host country, especially 
where there is a large potential readership, as is the case in several countries of our data set.  
Finally, regression (8) includes both policy and non-policy variables simultaneously. Overall, the 
estimated coefficients remain substantially unchanged in significance and magnitude, reinforcing 
our previous conclusions. In this specification, the border effects explained by policy variables, 
information costs and cultural proximity are very high, ranging from 73% for US export to Japan, 
to 96% for Canada’s export to the EU. Therefore, these explanations of border effects appear 
very important in the food sectors. However, note that the border coefficients, although strongly 
reduced with respect to our benchmark, are still significant. Thus, these explanations of the 
border effects are important, but do not explain the whole story of the strong trade reduction 
effect of the border. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the estimated coefficient of NTBs is positive but insignificant.    
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4.2.3. Endogeneity issues 
There are potential sources of endogeneity for both policy and non-policy determinants of border 
effect. First of all, in the above regressions we treat the level of protection as given. However, the 
level of protection is not exogenous. A large political economy literature of trade policy suggests 
that not only does trade policy affect imports, but also that the levels and growth of imports affect 
protection as well. Indeed, the endogenous theory of protection predicts that, in response to 
increased import competition, domestic interest groups will intensify their lobbying activity. 
Thus, higher levels of import will lead to greater protection. In this case, if import and protection 
are not modeled as being simultaneously determined, the estimated impact of protection on 
imports will be biased downward (see Trefler, 1993). Interesting, the recognition of the 
endogeneity of protection to import may partially explain why tariffs and NTBs often represent 
only a small fraction of the estimated border effect in the gravity literature.  
In order to check for this simultaneity bias, two stage last square regressions (2SLS) are used, 
where tariffs and non-tariff barriers are treated as endogenous, and instrumented by means of 
traditional political economy determinants.
9 Specifically, following Lee and Swagel (1997) we 
use industry conditions such as labor productivity, the wage per worker, the share of value added, 
and the amount of employment (and its square) plus industry fixed effects, to instrument for 
tariffs and NTBs.  
Table 5 displays the 2SLS estimate of tariffs and NTBs coefficients. Interestingly, on comparing 
the coefficients of policy variables, the striking feature is that the 2SLS estimate for both tariffs 
and NTBs is more than twice that of the OLS counterpart (see the bottom of Table 5).
10 In 
addition, after the inclusion of policy variables, the t-statistic in the 2SLS equations for policy 
variables is greater, while the reduction induced in the border effect coefficients is about 30% 
stronger than in the OLS regressions; all these are elements indicative of simultaneity bias. The 
bottom of Table 5 provides the Hausman (1978) specification test of the null hypothesis of no 
simultaneity bias.
11 As can be seen, we cannot reject this null at the 1% significance level for 
                                                      
9 Typically, the literature on endogenous protection treats tariffs as predetermined regressors in import equations 
(see, e.g., Ray, 1981; Lee and Swagel, 1997). The argument is that applied tariff rates do not diverge much from the 
World Trade Organsation (WTO) binding rates, set during the previous round. However, while this assumption is 
probably not too bad when applied to manufacturer industries, it appears quite strong in our case, because it is only 
very recently - since the Uruguay Round agreement – that tariffs in the food industry are strictly regulated under 
WTO rules. The results below strongly support this argument.      
10 The OLS coefficients of policy (and non-policy) variables, reported at the bottom of Table 5, are close, but not 
identical, to those reported in Table 3, because not every country had data available on the industry characteristics 
used as instruments. Thus, the sample is somewhat smaller than in previous regressions. 
11 Specifically, the bottom Table 5 shows the F-Hausman statistic (and its significance level) based on Hausman 
(1978) and Smith and Blundell (1986). Those papers showed that, in a linear model, an easy way of implementing 
the Hausman test for exogeneity, is to first run reduced form regressions of each of the variables suspected to be  
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either of our policy variables. Thus our results confirm the importance of treating trade barriers as 
endogenous when assessing the effect of protection on trade in gravity-like models.  
Another potential source of endogeneity is linked to the non-policy determinants of border 
effects, newspapers and books. Indeed, one can suppose that potentially omitted variables may 
affect both food import and the flow of newspapers and books. Think, for example, of the 
migrant stock: an increase in the number of migrants in a region may raise the import levels of 
food and newspapers simultaneously. If this is the case, the coefficients of non-policy variables 
will be biased due to omitted variables problem. Addressing this simultaneity bias, however, is 
difficult because of the lack of good instruments for newspapers and books. In any case, in order 
to at least understand the direction of the bias we perform some regressions where the 2001 
newspaper and book variables are instrumented with their 1995 values (see Table 5 columns 4, 5, 
6). The results appear to confirm our concern for simultaneity bias. Indeed the F-Hausman of no-
simultaneity cannot be rejected at 1% significance level for either proxy. However, if anything, 
endogeneity appears to introduce a downward bias. Virtually all the  coefficients for non-policy 
variables are now larger than in OLS regressions, and this is especially true for newspapers. Thus, 
while simultaneity bias may represent a problem, our results and conclusions do not appear 
driven by endogeneity issues.       
5  Summary and conclusions 
Using a structural gravity-like equation this paper has investigated the difficulties in market 
access faced by exporting countries when selling their food products to other countries. The 
approach uses a trade model under monopolistic competition, developed by Head and Mayer 
(2000), to measure and explain the so-called border effects – namely how much within country 
trade is above international trade after controlling for size, transport costs and price differences. 
Thus, the model extracts information on trade costs by comparing international and intra-national 
bilateral trade flows, along the lines initiated by McCallum (1995) and recently surveyed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Using this method we first investigated bilateral levels in 
border cost asymmetry between Canada, the EU, Japan and US food trade. Then, we tried to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
endogenous, on all the exogenous variables from our main regression and other exogenous variables which theory 
suggests might affect any of the endogenous variables. The second step involves computing the residuals from these 
auxilliary regressions and inserting them as additional right-hand side variables in our main estimating equations. If 
these residual are significant (insignificant), than the OLS estimation produces are inconsistent (consistent) 
estimates. Thus, the F-Hausman gives the F-statistic for the significance of these residuals in the auxilliary 




disentangle the role played by policy variables, compared with variables related to information 
and cultural proximity, in explaining the magnitude of border costs. 
The analysis strongly confirms the existence of important asymmetries in the levels of market 
access for food trade across both countries and industries. For example, US exports to the EU 
appear much more affected by the border than the exports of the EU to the US; the same can be 
said for the US exports to Canada. However, quite surprisingly, Japan seems to be more open to 
manufactured food imports from Quad countries, than Quad countries are to Japanese foods. 
Given the long term recognition of high food protection in Japan, this “openness” appears 
puzzling, and tends to persist even after controlling for differences in comparative advantage.  
The results show, overall, that the border effect, explained by policy variables, information costs 
and cultural proximity, is very high, ranging from 73% for US export to Japan to 96% for 
Canada’s exports to the EU. Therefore, such explanations for border effects in the food sectors 
appear very important. It is interesting to note that tariffs and NTBs together explain about 39% 
of the trade reduction effect of national borders, and this role appears significantly stronger if we 
recognize the endogeneity of protection due to political economy arguments. All this would point 
to potential gain being achieved from policy reform. Nevertheless, because the effect of policy 
barriers seem dominated by consumer preferences and information related costs, the distortions 
and welfare consequences of the border appear, at least partially, mitigated.  
Further work is needed to better quantify the impact of policy and non-policy barriers on national 
borders. For example, with regard to policy, we actually have good data for just one cross section, 
and this reduces our ability to look at the effects of change in protection over time, and thus 
limits the possibility of a better identification of the effect of tariffs and NTBs. On the non-policy 
side, a challenge for the future is to identify, and separate, the effect of consumer preferences 
from that of information related costs. This is an important point as the policy implications of 
these two trade costs are, evidently, quite different.  
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Table 1. Tariffs (2001) and AVE of NTBs (1999-2000) in QUAD countries. 
 
CAN EU USA JPN CAN EU USA JPN
Production, processing and preserving of meat 16.0 21.1 1.7 49.1 25.1 41.7 35.6 41.3
Processing and preserving of fish 1.2 11.2 1.4 6.6 13.5 26.0 20.1 23.3
Processing and preserving of fruit  5.1 15.7 6.5 13.4 15.7 47.3 33.4 43.4
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils 4.3 11.6 4.4 6.2 4.5 32.8 3.7 19.5
Manufacture of dairy products 101.0 44.6 17.7 111.4 52.8 79.9 67.9 73.6
Manufacture of grain mill products 6.2 42.9 3.6 182.9 23.4 34.9 6.8 30.5
Manufacture of starches and starch products 6.3 45.2 3.4 36.6 27.5 61.0 0.0 49.3
Manufacture of prepared animal feed 12.3 16.5 3.8 6.5 0.0 47.6 0.0 19.4
Manufacture of bakery products 3.5 12.6 0.4 14.6 0.0 53.8 30.0 51.8
Manufacture of sugar 4.0 61.9 19.1 150.1 0.0 59.9 0.0 45.5
Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 17.8 12.8 6.3 21.1 0.0 68.5 4.6 39.3
Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar 6.2 24.5 4.7 24.6 0.0 66.6 53.4 44.0
Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 12.9 10.4 5.3 21.5 14.1 63.7 47.0 42.7
Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 1.5 7.1 0.4 22.2 0.0 0.0 23.7 34.0
Manufacture of wines 23.2 12.2 5.9 30.6 0.0 0.0 9.9 9.7
Manufacture of malt liquors and malt 1.2 31.7 0.7 40.4 55.4 73.5 0.0 61.6
Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral water 12.9 7.0 3.1 6.5 0.0 53.4 10.4 41.7
Manufacture of tobacco products 7.5 39.7 4.4 7.9 0.0 30.5 0.0 0.0
Tariff NTB ave
 




Table 2. Border effects in the QUAD countries food trade 
Dependent variable
Time period 1996-01 1996-01 1996-01 1996-01
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Yj/Yi 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.82
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Distance ij/Distance ii -1.40 -1.08 -1.22 -1.08
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Common Language 0.02 0.94 0.92 0.80
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Contiguity 1.26 1.13 1.01 1.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ln prices -1.99 0.10 -0.97 -1.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18)
Ln gdp-pc 0.71 0.73
(0.09) (0.09)







EU         EU -4.24 -3.99 -4.14
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
CAN         EU -5.54 -6.05 -6.03
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
EU         CAN -6.55 -5.37 -5.57
(0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
CAN         USA -4.62 -4.54 -4.56
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
USA         CAN -6.48 -6.22 -6.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
CAN         JPN -2.19 -3.44 -3.67
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
JPN         CAN -8.04 -6.07 -6.47
(0.24) (0.28) (0.28)
EU         JPN -3.56 -3.85 -4.04
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
JPN         EU -7.79 -6.55 -6.71
(0.16) (0.20) (0.20)
USA        EU -5.40 -5.81 -6.07
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
EU         USA -5.03 -3.94 -4.19
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
USA         JPN -1.71 -2.88 -3.10
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
JPN         USA -5.98 -4.11 -4.55
(0.22) (0.26) (0.26)
Adj R-square 0.419 0.511 0.517 0.519
# obs. 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061
Ln (Imports / Intra-country trade)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS regression in columns from (1) to (3); Heckman’s 
regression in column (4). See text.  
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Table 3. Policy and non-policy determinants of national border effects 
Dependent variable
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Yj/Yi 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.79
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Common Language 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.50 0.33 0.29 0.28
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Contiguity 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.86 0.68 0.70 0.71
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Ln Distance ij/Distance ii -1.24 -1.24 -1.22 -1.23 -0.99 -1.14 -1.06 -1.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Ln prices -2.11 -2.10 -2.05 -2.06 -3.03 -3.02 -3.19 -3.15
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Ln gdp-pc 1.22 1.22 1.19 1.20 1.53 1.56 1.61 1.60
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Ln land 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.45
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln (1+Tariff) -2.19 -1.78 -1.82
(0.45) (0.47) (0.46)
Ln (1+NTBave) -1.94 -1.39 -1.33
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48)
Ln Newspapers 0.13 0.06 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln Books 0.28 0.22 0.22
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Bilateral Border coefficients
EU         EU -3.87 -3.87 -3.90 -3.89 -3.16 -2.31 -2.37 -2.40
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
CAN         EU -6.24 -5.82 -5.55 -5.40 -4.97 -4.25 -4.18 -3.36
(0.37) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44)
EU         CAN -5.02 -4.74 -4.82 -4.64 -4.51 -2.87 -3.17 -2.80
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
CAN         USA -4.40 -4.34 -4.09 -4.13 -3.67 -2.25 -2.45 -2.19
(0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40)
USA         CAN -6.08 -5.93 -5.88 -5.81 -5.46 -4.22 -4.39 -4.14
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36)
CAN         JPN -3.86 -3.18 -3.27 -2.88 -3.26 -2.31 -2.42 -1.46
(0.54) (0.57) (0.56) (0.58) (0.55) (0.56) (0.56) (0.60)
JPN         CAN -5.29 -5.04 -5.13 -4.97 -4.84 -3.14 -3.45 -3.13
(0.71) (0.69) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) (0.74) (0.74) (0.73)
EU         JPN -4.35 -3.72 -3.78 -3.43 -3.99 -2.94 -3.12 -2.22
(0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.42)
JPN         EU -5.91 -5.49 -5.26 -5.10 -5.10 -3.94 -4.07 -3.27
(0.50) (0.50) (0.53) (0.53) (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54)
USA        EU -6.11 -5.67 -5.43 -5.26 -5.59 -4.65 -4.77 -3.94
(0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.41)
EU         USA -3.49 -3.36 -3.18 -3.16 -3.02 -1.63 -1.87 -1.56
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37)
USA         JPN -3.55 -2.91 -3.00 -2.63 -3.64 -3.00 -3.17 -2.25
(0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
JPN         USA -3.27 -3.13 -3.00 -2.96 -2.99 -1.40 -1.72 -1.43
(0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
Adj R-square 0.532 0.537 0.535 0.555 0.548 0.554 0.555 0.562
# obs. 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355
Ln (Imports / Intra-country trade)
 




Table 4.  Effect of policy and non-policy barriers on border, language,  
contiguity and distance  
All
Tariff NTB Both Newspapers Books Both
Borders
CAN to EU -34% -50% -57% -83% -89% -90% -96%
CAN to JPN -49% -45% -62% -57% -82% -79% -92%
CAN to USA -6% -26% -24% -64% -91% -88% -91%
EU to CAN -24% -18% -31% -51% -91% -86% -91%
EU to EU 0% 3% 2% -63% -83% -81% -81%
EU to JPN -46% -43% -60% -39% -79% -73% -89%
EU to USA -12% -26% -28% -48% -88% -82% -87%
JPN to CAN -23% -15% -28% -47% -91% -86% -90%
JPN to EU -34% -48% -56% -68% -89% -87% -94%
JPN to USA -12% -24% -26% -32% -88% -80% -86%
USA to CAN -14% -18% -23% -58% -88% -84% -88%
USA to EU -36% -50% -57% -52% -81% -77% -90%
USA to JPN -48% -43% -60% 14% -47% -32% -73%
Language 0% -1% -1% -47% -50% -54% -54%
Contiguity 0% 2% 1% -12% -26% -24% -23%
Distance 0% -2% -1% -29% -11% -20% -21%
Policy barriers Non policy barriers
 
Notes: The figures reported are variation in border effects computed by comparing the border coefficients of 
Table 3, column from (2) to (8), with the coefficients of baseline regression of column (1). See text.  
 
Table 5. Robustness checks: 2SLS regressions 
Regression (1) (2) (4) (5)
Independent Variables Tariff NTB Books Newspapers
Coeff. Variable -4.90 -4.24 -3.91 -2.34 0.32 0.19 0.21 0.10
(0.88) (0.89) (1.02) (1.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Bilateral Border coefficients
EU         EU -3.89 -3.97 -2.11 -2.93
(0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.20)
CAN         EU -5.31 -4.71 -3.99 -4.50
(0.42) (0.51) (0.42) (0.41)
EU         CAN -4.42 -4.61 -2.61 -4.37
(0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.35)
CAN         USA -4.21 -3.64 -1.91 -3.36
(0.36) (0.40) (0.41) (0.37)
USA         CAN -5.83 -5.69 -3.97 -5.27
(0.33) (0.35) (0.39) (0.35)
CAN         JPN -2.25 -2.46 -2.03 -2.97
(0.63) (0.60) (0.57) (0.55)
JPN         CAN -4.88 -5.10 -2.97 -4.83
(0.69) (0.73) (0.75) (0.72)
EU         JPN -2.88 -3.03 -2.72 -3.82
(0.44) (0.45) (0.39) (0.37)
JPN         EU -5.07 -4.56 -3.78 -4.94
(0.54) (0.61) (0.54) (0.52)
USA        EU -5.24 -4.68 -4.51 -5.51
(0.41) (0.49) (0.39) (0.37)
EU         USA -3.05 -2.64 -1.27 -2.73
(0.32) (0.36) (0.36) (0.32)
USA         JPN -2.08 -2.30 -2.88 -3.65
(0.57) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50)
JPN         USA -2.98 -2.68 -1.18 -2.93
(0.61) (0.65) (0.67) (0.65)
# obs. 2,207 2,207 2,207 2,207
Adj R-square 0.537 0.533 0.551 0.549
OLS Coeff. Variable -2.05 -2.05 -1.63 -1.53 0.28 0.13 0.22 0.05
(0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (0.51) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
F-Hausman 31.01 22.53 105.57 80.15
(significance level) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)



































Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression have a specification identical to 
regressions of Table 3, but use 2SLS procedure. The instruments for tariffs are the amount of employment 
(and its square), the labor productivity, the wage per worker, the share of value added and the industry fixed 
effects; the instruments for NTBs are the labor productivity, the wage per worker, the share of value added 





Table A1. Bilateral trade among QUAD countries (million US$) 
 
CAN-EU 1,535        1.6% 1,671      1.7% 1,706      1.8%
EU to CAN 980           64% 1,105      66% 1,148      67%
CAN to EU 554           36% 566         34% 558         33%
CAN-JPN 1,359        1.4% 1,255      1.3% 1,448      1.5%
CAN to JPN 1,329        98% 1,224      98% 1,417      98%
JPN to CAN 30             2% 31           2% 32           2%
CAN-USA 9,575        10.0% 11,388     11.7% 12,265     12.8%
CAN to USA 5,459        57% 6,771      59% 7,500      61%
USA to CAN 4,116        43% 4,617      41% 4,765      39%
EU-JPN 3,837        4.0% 3,851      4.0% 4,004      4.2%
EU to JPN 3,760        98% 3,779      98% 3,933      98%
JPN to EU 77             2% 72           2% 72           2%
EU-USA 8,964        9.3% 9,882      10.2% 9,897      10.4%
EU to USA 6,154        69% 6,951      70% 7,367      74%
USA to EU 2,810        31% 2,931      30% 2,530      26%
USA-JPN 9,856        10.2% 8,997      9.3% 9,702      10.2%
USA to JPN 9,479        96% 8,566      95% 9,248      95%
JPN to USA 377           4% 431         5% 454         5%
EU-EU 61,052       63.5% 60,169     61.9% 56,491     59.1%




Notes: EU countries are: Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, Sweden 
Source: Comtrade database 
 
 





Manufacture of sugar 1542 -6.18 483      0.54 449       
Manufacture of prepared animal feed 1533 -4.87 131      0.59 853       
Manufacture of tobacco products 1600 -4.54 93        0.44 617       
Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral water 1554 -4.44 86        0.54 856       
Manufacture of malt liquors and malt 1553 -3.96 53        0.43 716       
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils 1514 -3.61 37        0.48 887       
Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar 1544 -3.42 57        0.60 770       
Manufacture of bakery products 1541 -3.23 25        0.59 899       
Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 1549 -3.19 24        0.59 923       
Production, processing and preserving of meat 1511 -2.87 18        0.59 835       
Processing and preserving of fruit  1513 -2.65 14        0.68 929       
Manufacture of wines 1552 -2.53 13        0.75 507       
Manufacture of starches and starch products 1532 -2.32 10        0.55 875       
Manufacture of grain mill products 1531 -2.30 10        0.63 870       
Processing and preserving of fish 1512 -2.10 8          0.58 780       
Manufacture of dairy products 1520 -1.85 6          0.55 876       
Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1543 -1.62 5          0.67 881       
Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 1551 -1.20 4          0.66 534       
 
Note: Border effects are given by the antilog of border coefficients. Coefficients (not reported) on relative 
production, distance, land per-capita, contiguity and language are systematically significant and display 
the correct sign, otherwise prices and GDP per-capita in few regressions are insignificant and/or with 
wrong sign. 
 